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Abstract: This study re-examines the trade creation effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) under the 
duty drawback (DD) regime. We theoretically demonstrate that firms’ switch from the DD to RTA regime 
increases or decreases their imports and empirically analyze the regime-switching effect on imports using 
firm-level trade data in Thailand, for 2011–2017. We find that firms’ switch to the RTA regime increases 
their imported inputs for domestic production rather than for expanding exports. In terms of total exports, 
medium-sized firms switch to the RTA regime. The large-sized firms continue importing under the DD 
regime even after RTAs’ entry. 
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1. Introduction 
     The existence of other preference regimes plays a key role in the trade creation effect 
of regional trade agreements (RTAs). Most studies have assumed that firms use the most 
favored nation (MFN) tariffs before the conclusion of RTAs. When the entry of RTAs induces 
firms to switch from MFN to RTA tariffs, they increase their exports because of the reduction 
in tariff rates. Based on this preconception, we expected the RTAs to exert a positive effect 
on trade. However, this may not be true. Firms might use other preference regimes before 
the RTAs enter into force. One example of such a regime is the duty drawback regime for 
raw materials imported for producing export products. The importers switching from the 
duty drawback to the RTA regime may not witness an increase in their imports if they were 
enjoying duty-free imports even before the entry of RTAs into force. However, the studies 
                                                   
* We would like to thank Naoto Jinji, Kyoji Fukao, Shujiro Urata, Fukunari Kimura, Hitoshi Sato, Kozo 
Kiyota, Masahiro Endoh, and the seminar participants of the JSIE 2020 Meeting and the Institute of 
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Grant Number # 17H02530. All remaining errors are ours. 
# Corresponding author: Kazunobu Hayakawa; Address: Wakaba 3-2-2, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba, 
261-8545, Japan. Tel: 81-43-299-9500; Fax: 81-43-299-9724; E-mail: kazunobu_hayakawa@ide-gsm.org. 
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on RTAs have paid little attention to this possibility. Given this, it is important to re-consider 
the trade creation effect of RTAs in the presence of other preference regimes. 
     This study aims to examine how users of other preference regimes change their trade 
when they switch to an RTA regime. We mainly focus on the duty drawback regime in 
addition to other similar regimes, in terms of requirements and benefits. While both the 
duty drawback and RTA regimes may not require the importers of materials to pay tariffs, 
there are three crucial differences between the two regimes. First, the materials imported 
using the RTA regime can be used to produce goods for the domestic market, while those 
imported using the drawback regime cannot be used for domestic production. Second, the 
administrative work is conducted by the material importers when claiming the drawback 
regime, while it is conducted by the material exporters when claiming the RTA regime. Thus, 
the player who bears the administrative costs is different between the two regimes. Finally, 
the use of the RTA regime may increase the import prices of the materials because it requires 
compliance with the rules of origin (RoO). These differences affect the choice of tariff 
regimes, and thereby lead to a change in firms’ trade. 
     In this context, we theoretically examine firms’ choice of tariff regimes by employing 
the international trade model with firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity. We suppose 
that before the RTA enters into force, the firms can import materials either under the MFN 
or duty drawback regime. We show that firms with a relatively high productivity choose to 
use the drawback regime, while the rest select the MFN regime. After the conclusion of an 
RTA, the drawback users with a relatively low productivity switch to the RTA regime to 
import the materials. Although the use of the RTA regime leads to an increase in the import 
prices of the materials, this switch is profitable because it does not require the importers to 
pay for the fixed costs. This switch can exert a negative or positive effect on the imports. The 
rise in material costs, that is, import prices, leads to a decline in the import quantity and 
hurts imports. However, the positive effect comes from the use of duty-free materials to 
produce goods for the domestic market. Since the duty drawback regime does not allow 
firms to use the materials to produce for the domestic market, the firms switching to the 
RTA regime expand the output for the domestic market, and thereby increase the material 
imports. In sum, the magnitude relationship between these positive and negative effects 
plays a crucial role in determining whether RTAs result in increasing imports in the 
presence of other preference regimes. 
     Next, we empirically investigate the (net) effect of regime-switching on imports by 
employing detailed firm-level trade data in Thailand, for the period between 2007 and 2011. 
Unlike the firm-level trade data used in the other studies, our data include information on 
the tariff regime in importing. This approach allows a direct examination of how firms 
switching from the drawback to the RTA regime in importing change their imports from 
RTA partner countries. In our analysis, we incorporate some similar regimes into the 
drawback regime (e.g., preference regimes for bonded warehouses, free zones, or 
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investment promotion). Subsequently, we classify firms according to their major import 
regime (i.e., the regime with the largest imports). It must be noted that the imports under 
the drawback regime accounted for approximately 30% of the total imports in Thailand in 
2011. Thus, the drawback users occupy a non-negligible fraction of the national imports. 
The simple regression analyses show that the import growth between 2007 and 2011 was 
20–30% higher in firms switching from the duty drawback to the RTA regime than that of 
the non-switching firms—firms that used the drawback regime in both 2007 and 2011. 
     We further examine the causal effect of this switch on imports. According to the main 
regimes in the two years, there are various types of firms that are not randomly chosen. 
Thus, the results of the simple regression analyses suffer from selection bias. However, 
owing to the existence of many types and thereby many selection mechanisms, it is difficult 
to address all the sources of endogeneity using the instrumental variable method. We use 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method. We restrict study firms to those in which the 
main regimes were duty drawback regimes in 2007, and either duty drawback or RTA 
regimes in 2011. Subsequently, by applying the PSM to these two kinds of firms, we correct 
the selection mechanism separating the two firms. We estimate the propensity of switching 
by using observable variables, including firms’ total exports, tariffs, or foreign ownership. 
We choose the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching method as the matching algorithm. In 
the statistical test, we use standard errors based on the innovation of Abadie and Imbens 
(2016). 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The results of the estimation on the 
propensity to switch to RTA regimes reveals that, among the drawback regime users, in 
terms of exports, the smaller-sized firms exhibit a higher likelihood to switch. Suppose that, 
in terms of trade values, the firm size is positively related to productivity. In that case, this 
result is consistent with our theoretical result that the drawback users with a relatively low 
productivity switch to the RTA regime in importing. We also conducted the matching 
analyses. The matched firms are well-balanced. The results show robust evidence that firms 
switching to the RTA regime increase their import of materials. However, we did not find 
an evidence that the switching firms increase exports. These results imply that the switching 
firms increase the import of materials owing to an increase in their outputs for the domestic 
market. We also show that switching firms have a higher share of domestic sales in the total 
sales than that of the non-switching firms. Another remarkable result is that a larger increase 
in imports can be found in firms that switched from the MFN to the RTA regime. 
Our findings have substantial implications for the literature on the trade creation effect 
of RTAs. We consider four types of importers according to their productivity and tariff 
regimes, before and after the RTA’s effectuation—importers with a high range of 
productivity use the drawback regime, those with medium-high productivity switch from 
the drawback to the RTA regime, those with medium-low productivity switch from the 
MFN to the RTA regime, and those in the low ranges continue using the MFN regime. 
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Importers with a high or low productivity range do not change their imports because they 
do not change their tariff regimes. Thus, those with a medium range of productivity play a 
vital role in the trade creation effect of RTAs. Although a switch to the RTA regime does not 
yield additional tariff advantages, importers with a medium-high productivity range 
increase their imports owing to an increase in production for the domestic market.1 The 
importers with a medium-low range also increase their imports simply because of the 
reduced tariff rates that accompany the switch from the MFN to the RTA rate.  
In sum, the size of the trade creation effect of RTAs is determined by the magnitude of 
the increase in the import of firms switching from the drawback or the MFN regime to the 
RTA regime. It should be noted that these two types of firms have a medium range of 
productivity, not a high range, and hence the absolute magnitude of their imports may not 
occupy a significant fraction in the national imports. In our study sample, the imports by 
such switching firms account for 23% of the total imports in the post-RTA year of 2011. 
Therefore, the increase in (national) imports by RTAs is not large. Many gravity studies have 
found small or seemingly implausible results in the RTA dummy variable (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2007). For example, Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) conducted meta-analyses on RTA 
coefficients and showed that 312, out of 1827, estimates are even negative. Other meta-
analyses (e.g., Kohl, 2014; Afesorgbor, 2017) also showed similar results. Our results would 
add to the evidence on such a small magnitude of the trade creation effect of RTAs. In other 
words, the trade creation effect becomes small if many productive firms keep using the 
drawback regime. 
     Our study is not the first to examine other preference regimes, especially the duty 
drawback regime. The existing studies on the subject are Hamada (1974), Panagariya (1992), 
Sargent and Matthews (2001), Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (2003), Ianchovichina (2004, 
2007), Egger and Egger (2005), Mah (2007), Cruz and Bussolo (2015), and Brandt and 
Morrow (2017). The first two are early theoretical studies on the duty drawback regime. 
Hamada (1974) showed that an increase in foreign investments in duty-free zones does not 
necessarily increase national income. Panagariya (1992) showed that increases in input 
tariffs with a duty drawback are more likely to be welfare-improving. Most empirical 
studies focus on the processing trade perhaps because of data availability (e.g., in the 
European Union or China). For example, Egger and Egger (2005) examined the 
determinants of processing trade using the country pair-product-level data in Europe. A 
similar analysis can be found for China in Brandt and Morrow (2017). Using industry-
province data, they examined the role of input tariffs in the choice between ordinary and 
processing trades. 
                                                   
1 If we consider a cumulation rule of RoO and firms’ export of their outputs to partner countries of RTAs, 
only the inputs imported using the RTA tariffs can be accumulated as “within-RTA inputs.” Subsequently, 
firms that switch to the RTA regime can comply with RoO and enjoy lower output tariffs. In this case, the 
switching firms may increase their exports of outputs. Our theoretical model takes into account this effect.  
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Our study differs from these studies in terms of the following points. In regard to 
theoretical analysis, the basic structure of our model is similar to that of Brandt and Morrow 
(2017). The choice between the drawback and MFN regimes, in our model, corresponds to 
the choice between the processing and ordinary trades in their model. Brandt and Morrow 
(2017) investigate the effects of input tariff reduction when some firms choose the processing 
regime, while others choose ordinary trade. In our theoretical model, we add another regime, 
that is, an RTA regime, whose utilization also reduces input tariffs. As mentioned above, 
there are some important trade-offs between the drawback and RTA regimes. Owing to the 
compliance of RoO, the input prices under the RTA regime are higher than those under the 
drawback regime. However, importers also bear some fixed costs to utilize the duty 
drawback regime. As a result, our theoretical model presents more fruitful results in relation 
to the choice of tariff regimes and the trade impacts of input tariff reduction. 
In regard to the empirical analysis, our estimation of the propensity of regime-
switching contributes to uncovering the determinants of other preference regimes, similar 
to the studies above. However, we differentiate between the three regimes—MFN, RTA, and 
other preference regimes. Furthermore, we estimate such propensity at a firm (-country-
product) level rather than at an aggregated level (e.g., an industry- or product-level). As a 
result, for example, we demonstrate that small-sized importers tend to switch from the duty 
drawback to the RTA regime; to the best of our knowledge, this aspect has never been 
revealed in the literature.2 Our study does not end with determinants. We further investigate 
the impacts of regime-switching on trade at the firm level. Hayakawa (2015) and Hayakawa 
et al. (2019a) analyze the firm-level effects of utilizing RTA regimes on import prices or some 
performance indicators (e.g., employment). However, these studies do not shed light on 
other preference regimes.3  
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses other 
preference regimes. Section 3 theoretically examines the choice of firms’ tariff regimes and 
the effect of RTAs on trade. After explaining our empirical framework in Section 4, we 
present our empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this study. 
                                                   
2 Namely, the choice of tariff regimes in importing is not random, indicating the important implication 
of our findings for the existing studies in this literature. For example, Cruz and Bussolo (2015) conducted 
the difference-in-differences (DID) analyses on the impacts of input tariffs on export performance by 
comparing importers under the ordinary trade regime (i.e., MFN or RTA regime) with those under the 
DD regime. However, those two types of importers are not exogenously assigned. Thus, based on their 
DID analyses, the estimates still suffer from the sample-selection bias. 
3  Several studies examine the determinants of the utilization of RTAs or generalized system for 
preferences. The example includes Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin (2006), Manchin (2006), Bureau, 
Chakir, and Gallezot (2007), Hakobyan (2015), Hayakawa, Kim, and Yoshimi (2017), and Hayakawa, 
Urata, and Yoshimi (2019b). By using country pair-product-level trade data, these studies found the 
significant contribution of various elements such as preference margin (i.e., MFN tariff rates minus RTA 
tariff rates), rules of origin, or transaction sizes. The theoretical studies in this context include Demidova 




2. Other Preference Regimes 
     This section discusses various preference regimes. Although the variety and benefits 
of those regimes differ by country, this section explains the regimes adopted in Thailand, as 
an example. Specifically, we consider five regimes—bonded warehouses, free zones, 
investment promotion, duty drawbacks for raw materials imported for the production of 
export products, and duty drawbacks for re-exportation. While benefits under the first three 
are realized immediately at the time of importation, those under the latter two regimes 
essentially represent the refund of the duty already paid, which is collected when the 
exportation or re-exportation is achieved4. The benefits offered under these five regimes, 
which may also vary among regimes, are different from those under RTAs, at least in the 
following five aspects. 
The first aspect focuses on beneficiaries. RTA regimes can be chosen irrespective of the 
use purpose of the imported goods. These goods can be used to produce goods for the 
domestic market or export market or distributed to firms or customers. However, 
beneficiaries under the bonded warehouses, free zones, and duty drawback regimes are 
required to import goods only for their production and export activities. Concerning the 
imports under investment promotion, beneficiaries depend on the imported goods. 
Concerning the imports of machinery, domestic market and export-oriented manufacturers 
can benefit from the investment promotion regime, while only export-oriented 
manufacturers benefit from this regime during the importation of raw materials. 
The second aspect is the eligibility of goods. The goods eligible for RTA regimes are 
listed in the legal text of RTAs. Specifically, subject to negotiations among RTA members, 
eligible goods can be raw materials, machinery, or final products. Conversely, eligible goods 
mainly include raw materials, under the other privilege regimes. All the other regimes grant 
eligibility to goods used to produce finished products. Machinery imported for the 
production process can be eligible only under free zones and investment promotion regimes. 
The duty drawback for re-exportation applies to any good—raw materials, machinery, or 
final products–provided that such goods do not undergo any transformation from the time 
of importing to that of exporting. 
Third, the depth of tariff reduction differs by regime. Under the RTA regimes, while 
tariffs for a large portion of traded goods are eliminated, some goods keep positive rates 
because of their sensitivity to the economy. Most of the other privilege regimes allow a 
                                                   
4  Nevertheless, imports are recorded as those under the duty drawback regimes. Indeed, before 
importing, firms must submit the declaration form on the use of duty drawback regimes and pay the 
amount equivalent to import duties to the customs. This procedure implies that firms cannot enjoy the 
refund of import duties when importing under the MFN regime even if all of the imported inputs are 
used for the production of export goods. In addition, to get the refund, exportation must be completed 
within a year from the importation.  
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deeper tariff reduction. Tariffs for all raw materials imported under free zones, investment 
promotion, and bonded warehouse regimes are virtually exempted. Concerning machinery, 
based on the decision of the Board of Investment of Thailand, the imports under free zones 
are tariff-free, while those under the investment promotion regime may be either tariff-free 
or subject to a 50% tariff reduction. The duty drawback regime allows a full refund if raw 
materials are imported to produce goods for the export market; it also allows a refund equal 
to nine-tenths or the excess of one thousand Thai Baht of the duty already paid, whichever 
is higher if goods are imported for re-exportation. 
The fourth aspect is that the originating status of goods has different impacts on 
eligibility. Goods are qualified under RTA regimes if they are substantially produced in RTA 
member countries and meet the relevant originating criteria specified in the RoO. However, 
this status does not pose an issue for importation under other privilege regimes. Goods 
qualified for these regimes may be produced in and exported from anywhere in the world. 
Finally, except for the RTA regime, importers are required to submit an evidence of 
compliance to the authority in charge. The proof of compliance includes the production 
formula, the necessity claim that explains why imports are preferred to locally produced 
goods, and other relevant documents. This inevitably results in higher compliance costs. 
However, importers are not required to produce this evidence in order to claim preferential 
benefits under the RTA regime; this is because all RTAs concluded by Thailand adopt third-
party approval in the certification of goods’ origin. As an evidence, they are only required 
to submit a certificate of origin issued by a competent authority in the exporting country. 
Consequently, the burden and cost of proving the eligibility under the RTA regime are 
imposed mainly on exporters.5 
Many countries introduce similar regimes. In particular, there is high popularity of 
the duty drawback regime for raw materials imported to produce goods for the export 
market. For example, the WTO (2003) introduced this regime in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Slovakia, Turkey, and Uganda. The JETRO website also highlights the 
presence of a similar preference in South Korea, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Australia, Canada, the United States, Colombia, Peru, European Union, Iran, and Ethiopia.6 
In short, these preference regimes are adopted across the globe, and not just in specific 
regions/countries. Therefore, it is important to consider their existence when considering 
the effect of RTAs on trade. 
 
                                                   
5 Furthermore, on top of tariff reduction, certain regimes grant additional duty privileges to firms. The 
exemption of excise tax exists for goods imported under bonded warehouse and duty drawback for raw 
materials imported to produce goods for the export market. The free zones allow the imported goods to 




3. Theoretical Analysis 
This section builds a theoretical model with firm heterogeneity to examine firms’ 
choices of tariff regimes in importing input materials and their decisions to export final 
products. The difference in productivity plays a crucial role in determining how firms react 
to the formation of RTAs. Each firm chooses one regime in procuring each input, from the 
following three regimes: (1) the MFN regime in which MFN tariffs are applied to inputs, (2) 
the DD regime in which a firm uses the duty-drawback (DD) system, and (3) the RTA regime 
in which a firm imports inputs from RTA partner countries by using the RTA tariffs that are 
lower than the MFN tariffs. Firms choosing the MFN and RTA regimes can sell their 
products in the domestic market and export them if exporting generates positive profits. We 
suppose that firms choosing the DD regime in procuring inputs export their products and 
do not sell them in the domestic market.7  
 
3.1. Setup of the Model 
There are two countries where final products are consumed—a home country 
(country ℎ) and a foreign country (country 𝑥𝑥). There are other countries that supply inputs 
used for final products. Consumers in each country have the same preferences, and they 
consume a homogenous good and 𝑆𝑆  products whose goods are differentiated in each 







where 𝛽𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗=1 = 1 and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗0  is the consumption of the homogenous good. 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
total consumption of a differentiated product 𝑠𝑠 in country 𝑗𝑗, which is given by 








                                                   
7 In our study data, the share of inputs imported under the DD regime accounted for 75% in the firms 
that used the DD regime before the entry of RTA. This share increased to 98% after the RTA formations. 
This evidence indicates that firms choosing the DD regime do not use multiple tariff regimes depending 
on the sales destination of their outputs. Specifically, although it is legally possible, DD-regime users are 
less likely to sell their outputs to both the foreign and domestic markets by using both the DD regime 
and the MFN/RTA regime. They export the majority of their outputs to foreign countries. This fact 
supports our assumption.   Furthermore, if those firms also sell their products to the domestic market, 
firms switching from the DD regime to the RTA regime in input procurements would not increase the 
domestic sales; this would contradict the empirical result (see footnote 26). Other than that, the main 
results would remain unchanged. 
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where 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is the consumption of variety 𝑖𝑖, and 𝛪𝛪𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the set of available varieties in the 
country 𝑗𝑗 of product 𝑠𝑠. σ𝑗𝑗 ∈ (1, +∞) is the elasticity of the substitution between any two 
pairs of varieties within the product group 𝑠𝑠.  
By maximizing the consumers’ utility, subject to their budget constraints, the demand 




1−σ𝑠𝑠 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 , (3) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is the consumer price of the variety 𝑖𝑖 that the producing firm charges, and 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the consumer price index for product 𝑠𝑠 in country 𝑗𝑗.  
The homogenous good is produced only with labor, and we assume that one unit of 
output requires one unit of labor. It is produced in both countries ℎ and 𝑥𝑥  and freely 
traded without any trade costs between the countries. By choosing the homogenous good 
as a numeraire and setting the price of the good equal to one, the wage rates become 𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 =
𝑤𝑤ℎ = 1.  
Each variety 𝑖𝑖 of product 𝑠𝑠 is produced only by a single firm in the home country 
using labor and intermediate inputs. The firm that produces a variety 𝑖𝑖 is called a firm 𝑖𝑖. 
A variety 𝑖𝑖 of product 𝑠𝑠 is produced with a standard Cobb–Douglas function, which is 
given by 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) = 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)1−α𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)α, (4) 
where 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)  is the productivity parameter, 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)  is the labor input, 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)  is a CES 
composite of intermediate inputs, and 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1)  is the output elasticity of 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) . It is 
defined as  







 , (5) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is an input used to produce a variety 𝑖𝑖 of product 𝑠𝑠, and 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗 ∈ (1, +∞) is 
the elasticity of substitution between inputs. 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is the set of available inputs used to 
produce each variety 𝑖𝑖 of product 𝑠𝑠 . Each firm purchases these inputs from suppliers 
located in foreign countries, including the country 𝑥𝑥. Thus, 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) corresponds to the total 
import of inputs.8  
We assume that each firm produces a single variety, taking the prices of inputs as 
given. By solving the cost-minimization problem of each firm, the demand for each input 𝑑𝑑 
per unit of the final good output is given by  
𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) = 𝛾𝛾 �
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠−(1−α)
𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)
� 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)−𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠 , (6) 
                                                   
8 The model does not include domestic inputs because their inclusion complicates the model without 
changing the main results. 
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where 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is the price of each input that firm 𝑖𝑖 faces, 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) is the price index of inputs 
used to produce the variety 𝑖𝑖, and 𝛾𝛾 ≡ {α/(1 − α)}1−α is a positive parameter. The price 
index of the inputs is calculated as 






The unit cost to produce each variety of product 𝑠𝑠 in country 𝑗𝑗 becomes Γ𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖)α/𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖), 
where Γ ≡ 𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛾𝛾1/(𝛼𝛼−1)) is the positive parameter. By substituting (6) and (7) into (5), the 





which is decreasing in the price index of imported inputs. 
A final-good firm producing a variety 𝑖𝑖 of product 𝑠𝑠 maximizes the profit and sets 








Thus, a firm with a higher productivity charges a lower price. The price also decreases with 
a decline in the price index of inputs. The equilibrium consumer price is given by 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) =
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗(𝑖𝑖) , where the parameter 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≥ 1 is one plus the ad-valorem tariff rate imposed by 
country 𝑗𝑗 on imports of product 𝑠𝑠. If the variety is sold in the domestic market (𝑗𝑗 = ℎ), we 
set 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 1.  
 
3.2. The Input Costs under Each Regime 
When analyzing a firm’s choice of a tariff regime in procuring inputs, it is sufficient to 
focus on one product among the product sectors. Hence, we omit the subscript 𝑠𝑠 in the 
following analysis. The price of input 𝑑𝑑, 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘(𝑖𝑖), and the price index of inputs, 𝑍𝑍(𝑖𝑖), depend 
on the regime chosen by firm 𝑖𝑖. Let ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 be the fundamental price of the imported input 𝑑𝑑, 
which should reflect the technology of producing input 𝑑𝑑 and other locational factors (such 
as wages and transport costs) of the foreign country where the supplier of 𝑑𝑑 operates. 
When importing an input, each firm chooses one regime from the three regimes. 
The tariff-inclusive price of an input imported from a foreign country is as follows. 
First, if firm 𝑖𝑖 chooses the MFN regime, the input price will be given by 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘, 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≥ 1 is one plus the MFN tariff rate on input 𝑑𝑑 imposed by the home country. 
Second, if firm 𝑖𝑖 chooses the DD regime, then it will be free from input tariffs. In this case, 
we have 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) = ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘. Third, if there is an RTA between the foreign and home countries, and 
a firm in the home country imports 𝑑𝑑 with the RTA tariff, we have 
𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘, (10) 
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where 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∈ [1, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) is the one plus the preferential tariff rate of an RTA imposed on k 
imported from an RTA partner country. In addition, 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 is the cost of adjusting the 
procurement sources of input produced to meet the RoO for k. The adjustment cost is 
incurred by the producers of inputs and it is passed through to input prices.  
To make formations of RTAs meaningful, we restrict our attention to the case where 
𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) holds for the inputs imported from partner countries. This inequality 
requires that 1 > 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 holds, where 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 ≡ 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅/𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 ∈ (0,1) ) is the tariff ratio that 
captures how RTAs reduce the input tariff on input k. This assumption excludes the case in 
which firms never choose the RTA regime.  
 
3.3. Pre-RTA Regime Choices 
We consider each firm’s export decisions before the formation of an RTA and the 
choice between the MFN and DD regimes for input procurements. Since firms choosing the 
DD regime do not sell their products domestically, the DD regime is chosen only if the firms 
export their varieties to country 𝑥𝑥. If a firm uses the DD regime for at least one imported 
input, it must incur 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 as the fixed cost of getting the duty drawbacks for the imported 
inputs from the domestic government. As explained in Section 2, the fixed cost reflects the 
cost of submitting the evidence of compliance to the government. Since 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) is the lowest 
price for each input 𝑑𝑑 among the three regimes, and the fixed cost of getting drawbacks 
does not depend on the number of inputs imported by the DD system, it is optimal for firms 
to import all inputs using the DD regime (whenever they use the regime).9 This also implies 
that the use of the MFN regime in importing k implies that a firm also imports all other 
inputs with MFN tariffs. 
In this study, the firms importing all inputs under the MFN and DD regimes are 
referred to as the “MFN-type firm” and “DD-type firm,” respectively. Henceforth, 
superscripts 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐷𝐷 are attached to variables for the MFN-type and DD-type firms, 
respectively. Accordingly, the price index of inputs for the MFN-type firm and that for the 
DD-type firm are denoted by 𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀 and 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷, respectively.  










− 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥, (11) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥  is the fixed cost of the exports. By setting 𝐴𝐴 = σ−σ(σ − 1)𝜎𝜎−1Γ1−𝜎𝜎  and 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 =
[𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗(𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀)α]1−𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎−1𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗, the export profit can be rewritten as 
π𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎−1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 . (12) 
                                                   
9 Even if the fixed cost is incurred per input, a firm imports all inputs by the DD regime (if the firm uses 
it). This is because we can confirm that the degree of the profit-gain by using the DD system increases 
with a rise in the number of inputs imported by the DD regime. 
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In this profit function, 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗  captures the baseline profitability of selling a variety in the 
country 𝑗𝑗. 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 is increasing in the market size of country 𝑗𝑗, which is represented by 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗, 
and in the consumer price index, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 . It is decreasing in the input costs under the MFN 
regime, 𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀, and in the tariff on the final product, 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥. Firm 𝑖𝑖 exports its product if and only 
if π𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 0  holds. By solving π𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 0  with respect to 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) , the cutoff level of 
productivity is calculated as 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 ≡ [𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥/𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥]1/(𝜎𝜎−1). The MFN-type firms 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 export 
their varieties. The MFN tariffs are also applied to inputs used for domestic sales. The profit 
in the domestic market is given by:  
πℎ𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵ℎ𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎−1. (13) 
To simplify our analysis, we assume no fixed cost of domestic production, which implies 
that firms producing the final goods always serve the domestic market. The total profit of 
the MFN-type firm is given by Π𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = max[𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖), 0] + πℎ𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖). 

















− (𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷), (14) 
where 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ≡ 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷/𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀 represents the input-cost ratio that captures the degree of the reduction 
in the input costs for the DD-type firm relative to those for the MFN-type firm. To the extent 
that the tariffs on imported inputs are positive, at least for some inputs, 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 < 1 holds. 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 
decreases with an increase in the MFN rates of the input tariffs. A DD-type firm exports its 
product if and only if π𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 0 holds, and the cutoff level of the productivity becomes 
𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 ≡ (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α[(𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷)/𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥]1/(𝜎𝜎−1) . Since the DD-type firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷  only export 
their varieties and do not sell those varieties in the domestic market, a DD-type firm’s profit 
becomes Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) = max[𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖), 0]. 
     A firm’s export decision and the choice of regime for procuring inputs depend on the 
firm’s productivity. Figure 1 depicts the net profits of a firm in each market as a function of 
its productivity index, 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎−1. The slope of π𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) is steeper than that of π𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) because 
the DD-type firms are free from input tariffs, though they must incur additional fixed costs. 
The profit in the domestic market is always positive, but the export profit of an MFN-type 
firm and the profit of a DD-type firm are positive only for firms with a high productivity.  
===   Figure 1   === 
     By comparing Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) and Π𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖), given that both π𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) and π𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) are positive, we 
have  
Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) − Π𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) = 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎−1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 , (15) 
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where 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀 ≡ 𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥{(𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1} − 𝐵𝐵ℎ. Since 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 < 1 and 𝜎𝜎 > 1, (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) > 1 holds. We 
focus on the case where 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 < (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1 is satisfied such that 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀 > 0 holds. This 
ensures that firms with high productivity choose to be DD-type firms rather than MFN-type 
firms. Specifically, the cutoff level of the productivity, above which an exporting firm 
prefers to be a DD-type firm, becomes 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀 ≡ [𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/(𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴)]1/(𝜎𝜎−1).  
To consider several switching scenarios after the formation of an RTA, we restrict our 
attention to the case where some exporters choose to be MFN-type firms in the pre-RTA 
situation. Specifically, we focus on the case where Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) < Π𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) holds at 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) = 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 .10 
We have the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the home country does not form any RTA with supplier countries. If 
𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀 > 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 holds, then firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀 will import all inputs by the DD regime and 
export their outputs, firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀) will import all inputs by the MFN regime and 
sell their outputs in both the home and foreign countries, and firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 will import all 
the inputs under the MFN regime and sell their outputs in the home country. 
Figure 2 depicts the total profits in the two regimes and shows how firms with different 
productivities choose different regimes for input procurements.11 We can confirm that firms 
with a high productivity can cover the fixed cost of using the DD regime and choose that 
regime for all inputs.  
===   Figure 2   === 
 
3.4. Post-RTA Regime Choices 
Let us investigate how the formation of RTAs with supplier countries influences firms’ 
decisions to export and their choices of a regime in procuring inputs. If the partner countries 
of RTAs include country x, the tariff on the final good may also decrease from 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 to 𝑇𝑇′𝑥𝑥. 
We denote λx ≡ 𝑇𝑇′𝑥𝑥/𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 (∈ (0,1]) as the tariff ratio capturing how an RTA reduces output 
tariffs. In other words, 1/λx (> 1) is the preference margin of the output tariff. We suppose 
that a final-good firm can comply with RoO for the output tariff, and λx < 1 holds only if 
                                                   
10  This requires that 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 >  (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥  is satisfied. If 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 ≤ (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 
holds, the profit of the DD-type firm will always dominate the profit of the MFN-type firm and all the 
exporters will use the duty-drawback system whenever firms export their products.  
11 The different choices of regimes require (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 < 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 < (𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(1−σ) − 1. 
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it imports input using the RTA scheme. If country x is not included as an RTA partner or a 
firm uses the MFN regime or the DD regime for input procurements, λx = 1 holds.12  
If a firm chooses the RTA regime in importing 𝑑𝑑 from a partner country of RTAs, then 
the RTA tariff rate on the input will be applied. As 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) holds and no fixed 
cost is incurred under the MFN and RTA regimes, a firm will always prefer the RTA to the 
MFN regime whenever the RTA tariff is available. When an imported input is not produced 
in partner countries of RTAs, a firm cannot choose the RTA regime for that input; this 
scenario leads to the application of the MFN tariff rate. In this study, a firm that imports at 
least one input produced by the RTA regime is referred to as the RTA-type firm. The 
superscript 𝑅𝑅 is attached to variables for the RTA-type firms, and the price index of inputs 
is denoted by 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅 . It must be noted that 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅  consists of the prices of inputs imported with 
RTA tariffs and those imported with the MFN tariffs. The inclusion of the latter can be 
attributed to a firm’s dependence on the MFN regime when importing from non-RTA 
countries.13 We have 𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀 > 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅 > 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 and the input costs in the RTA regime are somewhere 
between the input costs under the DD and MFN regimes.  
An RTA-type firm’s profit from exporting to country 𝑖𝑖 becomes 





− 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥, (16) 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅 ≡ 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅/𝑍𝑍𝑀𝑀 is the input-cost ratio of the RTA-type firm relative to that of the MFN-
type firm. It satisfies 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 < 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅 < 1. In addition, we assume 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅 > 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘  for any 𝑑𝑑 imported 
from a partner country under the RTA regime. This assumption ensures that choosing the 
RTA regime over the MFN regime always increases the demand for 𝑑𝑑.14  
An important property of imported inputs to which the RTA tariffs are applied is that 
they can also be used in the final goods produced for domestic sales. An RTA-type firm’s 
profit from domestic sales becomes 






The total profit of the RTA-type firm is given by Π𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = max[𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), 0] + πℎ𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖).  
     Figure 3 shows how the profits of RTA-type firms exceed those of the MFN-type firms. 
Since firms bear lower input tariffs without incurring an additional fixed cost, the profit of 
                                                   
12 When utilizing the output tariffs of RTAs, exporting firms must comply with the RoO. In this case, we 
suppose that the fixed and marginal costs of meeting RoO are reflected in the level of 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 and 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥′ , 
respectively. It must be noted that, known as the no-drawback rule, the inputs imported under the DD 
regime are not qualified as originating inputs in the RoO in RTAs (Shadikhodjaev, 2013; WTO, 2002). 
13 Firms do not use the DD system and the RTA tariffs simultaneously because it is optimal for firms to 
import all the inputs with the DD system (whenever they use it). 
14 This inequality is reversed if inputs imported from the RTA partners, other than 𝑑𝑑, experience a larger 
decline in prices and a so-called “within RTA substitution effect” dominates the substitution effect 
between the RTA- and non-RTA-made inputs. Considering this case substantially complicates the 
analysis without changing the basic insights of our analysis. 
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an RTA-type firm always dominates that of an MFN-type firm in each market, given the 
productivity level.15 
===   Figure 3   === 
If 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ≡ (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α(𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥/𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥)1/(𝜎𝜎−1) = (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀  holds, we have π𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0 , and an 
RTA-type firm exports its variety. It must be noted that 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 always holds because 
(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α < 1. Intuitively, the RTA regime reduces the input costs and increases the profitability 
of exports; this enables the less productive firms to earn positive profits from exporting, 
compared to the case of the MFN-type firm.  
Figure 4 compares the total profit of each type. We can easily confirm that Π𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) >
Π𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) holds if evaluated at the same level of productivity, and firms always prefer to 
become RTA-type firms rather than MFN-type firms. However, firms may still prefer the 
DD regime to the RTA regime for input procurements and become a DD-type firm because 
the former realizes a higher degree of input-cost reductions, though firms incur the 
additional fixed cost. 
===   Figure 4   === 
By comparing Π𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)  with Π𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖),  given that export profits are positive in both 
regimes, we have 
Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) − Π𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) =  𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎−1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 , (18) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ≡ (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α(1−σ) �𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥{(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) − 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎} − 𝐵𝐵ℎ� . By (18), Π𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) ≥ Π𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)  is 
possible only if (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) > 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 + 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎 holds. Firms can increase their profits from 
domestic sales by choosing the RTA-type; however, this opportunity cannot be availed 
under the DD-type. Therefore, the total profit of the DD-type firm can dominate that of the 
RTA-type firm only if the profit gain from reducing the input costs,  (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) , 
dominates the relative fundamental profitability of the domestic market to the foreign 
market plus the gains from the reduction in the output tariff, 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 + 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎. Suppose that 
this inequality holds, then a firm that engages in exporting will prefer to become a DD-type 
firm rather than an RTA-type firm when 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 ≡ [𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/ (𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴)]1/(𝜎𝜎−1) holds.  
As in the pre-RTA situation, each firm’s export decision and choice of the regime 
depend on its productivity, as the following proposition suggests.  
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the home country forms RTAs with some of the supplier countries. 
Firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 import all inputs by the DD regime, while firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 
import inputs using the RTA regime from the RTA partners and the MFN regime from the non-RTA 
                                                   
15 If a firm must incur a fixed cost when importing inputs under the RTA regime, some firms whose 
productivity is low may choose to be an MFN- over an RTA-type firm, even after the RTA formation. 
However, considering this possibility does not change the main results of the paper. 
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partners. If 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 > 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 holds, RTA-type firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅� will sell their outputs in 
both the home and foreign countries, and RTA-type firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 will sell their outputs 
only in the home country. 
 
Thus, if 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 > 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 holds, some exporters with a relatively high productivity will choose 
the DD regime, while other exporters with a relatively low productivity will choose the RTA 
regime for importing inputs from the partner countries of RTAs.16 
 
3.5. RTA Formation and Regime Switches 
Let us now examine how an RTA formation influences firms’ behaviors. As Figure 4 
shows, some firms change their export decisions and choices of the regime in input 
procurements. We can calculate that  










𝜎𝜎−1� > 0 (19) 
holds because we have 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀 − 𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 = 𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥{𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α(1−σ) − 1} + 𝐵𝐵ℎ�(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)α(1−σ) − 1� > 0. This 
implies that firms whose productivity satisfies 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅) switch from the DD to 
RTA regime in importing inputs from the RTA partners. These firms witness an increase in 
the unit costs of the final goods produced because 𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅 > 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷, but they can save the fixed cost 
of using duty drawbacks. They can also enjoy a tariff reduction on the output if the RTA 
partner countries include country x, which is captured by 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥. 
     Exporting firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀) become the MFN-type firm before an RTA 
formation, but they switch to the RTA-type firm and procure inputs using the RTA tariffs. 
In addition since 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 holds, firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ,𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀) start exporting by switching 
from an MFN-type to an RTA-type firm. Firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 also switch to become RTA 
firms, even when they are still non-exporters. Proposition 3 summarizes these switches 
when exporting firms with different productivities choose a different regime with respect 
to their input procurement.  
                                                   
16 For 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 > 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 to hold, (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) − (𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥) < 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥  + 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎 < (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) must be satisfied. 
If 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥  + 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥1−𝜎𝜎 ≤ (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1) − (𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷/𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥) holds, exporting firms will always choose to becomes the 
DD-type firm, while the non-exporting firms will choose to become the RTA-type firms. If 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 +
λx
1−𝜎𝜎 > (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1)  holds, all firms will choose the RTA regime, and firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅  will 




Proposition 3. Consider the choices of regimes used by firms to import inputs from the partner 
countries of RTAs. Given that 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 > 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 holds, RTAs make: (i) exporting firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈
[𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀 ,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅)  switch from the DD to the RTA regime, (ii) exporting firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈
[𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀) switch from the MFN to the RTA regime, (iii) firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ,𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀) switch 
from the MFN to the RTA regime and start exporting, and (iv) firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 switch from 
the MFN to the RTA regime, but they still do not export. Exporting firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 
continue to choose the DD regime. 
 
Thus, among firms that initially choose the DD regime for input procurements, those with 
a relatively low productivity shift to the RTA regime, while those with a high productivity 
remain in the DD regime. 
 
3.6. Trade Effects of RTA Formation 
   Now, we investigate the trade effects of RTA formation for firms that switch to the 
RTA-type. Suppose, for simplicity, that country ℎ and country 𝑥𝑥 import many varieties 
from several foreign countries in each product category, so that RTA formations and 
resulting changes in firms’ choices do not affect the level of the consumer price index, 𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 
and 𝑃𝑃ℎ . 17  Proposition 3 suggests that an RTA formation changes firms’ type in input 
procurements if 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅  holds. Firms with 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅  continue as the DD-type 
firms. 
 
3.6.1 The Effect on Input Trade  
     We examine how RTAs with supplier countries change each firm’s import values of 
inputs. First, we consider the import of k from an RTA partner, for firms switching from the 
DD- to the RTA-type (𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ [𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀 ,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅) ). They always export their products to the 
country 𝑥𝑥. Let Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) be the switching firm’s change in the import value of 𝑑𝑑 used for 
producing variety 𝑖𝑖 from an RTA country. We have 
Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 + ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), (20) 
where Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) ≡ ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘{𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) −𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)}  is the change in each firm’s import values of 
inputs per unit of its output. In the second term, Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) is the change in 
                                                   
17 If firms’ export status and their choice of regime affect the consumer price index, trade effects of RTA 
formation will become more complicated. Specifically, even if an RTA formation decreases the input costs 
of firms, some firms may not increase their exports when the RTA decreases the consumer price index. 
Other than that, the assumption does not qualitatively affect the results of our model. 
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the volume of exports of outputs. An increase in the output increases the demand for inputs, 
given the input prices, thereby increasing the import value of 𝑑𝑑. The third term captures the 
import of inputs used for domestic sales.18 Since the switching firms start selling in the 
domestic market, they increase their imports of inputs. In (20), we can confirm that both 
Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)  and Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)  have ambiguous signs. The detailed calculations are given in 
Appendix A of the Online Appendix. Therefore, the RTA formation can either increase or 
decrease Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖). 
     The intuitive explanation of equation (20) is as follows. The sign of the first term is 
ambiguous. The switch from the DD to the RTA regime increases the price of k because firms 
enjoying duty drawbacks now face the RTA tariff, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , and the cost of meeting RoO 
incurred to input suppliers, 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘, is reflected in the input price. The increase in the input price 
directly decreases the demand for the input. However, the switch increases the price index 
of inputs, which increases the demand for input k due to a substitution effect. Therefore, the 
sign of Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) is ambiguous. Regarding Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), the increase in the input cost reduces 
the exports of the final good. However, a reduction in tariffs on the final good promotes 
exports. Therefore, the sign of Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) is also ambiguous if country x is an RTA partner. If 
country x is not an RTA partner, Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) < 0 always holds. Since the third term of (20) is 
always positive, Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) is more likely to be positive if the market size of the domestic 
country is sufficiently large such that the newly initiated domestic sales increase the imports 
of inputs. 
We can calculate that  

















− 1. (21) 
See Appendix A of the Online Appendix for a detailed calculation. Hence, the switching 
firms are more likely to increase the imports of inputs as 𝐵𝐵ℎ/𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 is larger, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 and 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾 are 
higher, 𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 is higher, and the preference margin of the output, 1/𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥, is larger. 
We can also examine the changes in imports at the firm level. The effect of switching 
on imports of inputs (i.e., inputs used for producing variety 𝑖𝑖 in an input set of 𝐾𝐾(𝑖𝑖)) from 
RTA countries at a firm level is given by 
Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = � Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾(𝑖𝑖)
(22) 
Since Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) has an ambiguous sign, Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) can be either positive or negative.  
Second, we consider the imports for switching firms from the MFN-type to the RTA-
type (𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀). We denote Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) as the change in the import value of 𝑑𝑑 from an 
RTA country. We have 
                                                   
18 Although we focus on the imports from the RTA member countries, we set 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 = 1 if k is imported 










+ ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) � Δ𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)
𝑗𝑗=ℎ,𝑥𝑥
for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀�
Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) + ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)Δ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ,𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀�
Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) + ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)Δ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅
, (23) 
where Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) ≡ ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘{𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) −𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)} is a change in each firm’s import values of inputs 
per unit of its output. The increase in outputs also increases the import of inputs. The second 
term captures how the change in the total volume of sales of the final good in country 𝑗𝑗 ∈
{ℎ, 𝑥𝑥}, Δ𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖), affects the import value of 𝑑𝑑. The third term in the middle 
of (23) captures the effect of starting exports on the import value of 𝑑𝑑. The effect of switching 
on the imports of inputs at a firm level from an RTA country is given by 
Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) = � Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾
(24) 
We can confirm that Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0 holds (see Appendix A of the Online Appendix) 
for inputs imported from RTA countries because the input tariff reduction of RTAs increases 
the demand for those inputs. In addition, Δ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0  and Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0  always hold, 
implying that each switching firm increases the amount of sales in each market it serves. 
Therefore, we always have Δ𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0 for inputs imported from an RTA country.19 The 
following proposition summarizes the trade effects on the imported inputs for switching 
firms.  
   
Proposition 4. The imported inputs from an RTA country that switched from the DD to the RTA 
regime are more likely to increase as the market size of the domestic country is larger, the RTA-tariff 
rate on input and the adjustment costs for meeting RoO are lower, the tariff on output is higher, or 
the preference margin on output is larger. There is always an increase in the imported inputs from 
an RTA country that switched from the MFN to the RTA regime. 
 
3.6.2 The Effect on Output Trade 
     Our next question is how RTAs with supplier countries affect the switching firms’ 
exports of their varieties to country 𝑥𝑥. Let Δ𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)  ≡ 𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷(𝑖𝑖) be the 
change in the export value of variety 𝑖𝑖, for firms that switched from the DD-type to the RTA-
type in their importing. We have 
















� . (25) 
                                                   
19 For inputs imported from a non-RTA country, we have Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) < 0 because the lower prices of 
RTA inputs decrease the demand for non-RTA inputs. When this negative effect outweighs the positive 
effect of increased sales, the switching firms decrease the imports of non-RTA inputs. 
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As does Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), the switching firms’ decision to increase or decrease their exports will 
depend on the relative magnitude of the preference margin on the output, which is captured 
by 1/𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎, and that of the increase in the input cost, which is captured by (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)α(σ−1). If 
the former effect dominates the latter, Δ𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) > 0 holds, and vice versa. In particular, 
if country x is not a member of RTAs (𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 = 1), Δ𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) < 0 holds.  
     Since the switch from the DD-type to the RTA-type increases the switching firms’ 
input costs, there may be a decline in their export values.20 However, the switch increases 
their revenues from their sales in the domestic market. If country x is not a member of RTAs, 
firms with high productivity that remain as the DD-type firms do not change their export 
values. Subsequently, firms with a medium-high productivity that switch from the DD- to 
the RTA-type decrease exports and increase domestic sales. This implies that RTA 
formations that liberalize input trade may prevent, rather than promote, the exports of firms 
with a medium-high productivity. 
For medium-low and low-productive firms that switched from the MFN-type to the 






⎧𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀(𝑖𝑖) for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀,𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑀𝑀�
𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖)𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅,𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀�
0 for 𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖) < 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅
. (26) 
The export values naturally increase in the case of firms that start exporting. For firms that 
initially export their varieties, we have  











− (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅)𝛼𝛼(𝜎𝜎−1) � > 0 (27) 
because 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅 < 1. Thus, firms that switched from the MFN- to the RTA-type always increase 
the export values of their outputs if they export after the RTA formation.  
Unlike the firms that switched from the DD-type, RTA formations with a part of 
supplier countries always promote the exports of final-good firms that chose the MFN-type 
before the RTA formations and switched to the RTA-type. However, these firms are less 
productive than the firms that initially chose the DD-type. The following proposition 
summarizes the trade effect on outputs for the switching firms. 
 
Proposition 5. If the tariff reduction of the output is sufficiently large to satisfy 1/𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎  >
(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)𝛼𝛼(𝜎𝜎−1), firms that switched from the DD- to the RTA-type will increase exports. Otherwise, 
                                                   
20 If there is a change in the consumer price index, the consumer price index for the RTA-type firms can 
be larger than that for the DD-type when the degree of price increases for other firms that shifted from 
the DD- to the RTA-type is large. In this case, the switching firm’s export value decreases when the 
negative effect from the increased input costs dominates the positive effect from the increased consumer 
price index. At least, a switching firm that experienced the highest cost-increase, among other switching 
firms, decreases its export value. 
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they will decrease exports. Firms that switched from the MFN- to the RTA-type always increase 
exports as long as they export after the RTA formations. 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
     This section explains our empirical framework to examine how firms switching from 
the drawback to the RTA regime change their imports. We first discuss the methodological 
framework and, subsequently, present the data sources and issues. 
 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
As theoretically demonstrated in the previous section, there are various types of 
importers according to the tariff regimes in the pre- and post-RTA periods. The tariff 
regimes used by the importers are not randomly assigned but are chosen based on their 
profit comparison. The chosen regime differs on the basis of firms’ characteristics. In other 
words, since the firm characteristics differ across the tariff regimes, a simple comparison of 
imports across the firm types includes not only the impacts of switching tariff regimes but 
also the differences in ex-ante firm characteristics. This endogeneity can be addressed by 
using instruments for the switching status. However, across all firm types, firms not only 
determine whether to switch from the drawback to the RTA regime but also choose between 
the MFN and RTA regimes and select whether to continue using the MFN regime. We need 
to consider all these selection mechanisms. As usual, however, it is difficult to find many 
plausible instruments. Thus, to address the selection bias above, we employ the PSM 
method. 
This study aims to evaluate the causal effect of switching from the drawback to the 
RTA regime on imports. Specifically, our indicator variable for this switching is 𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∈
{0,1}, which takes the value of one if firm f switches from the drawback regime to the RTA 
when importing product p from country c and the value of zero otherwise. The average 
effect of switching on imports (y), that is, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
is defined as 
ATT ≡ E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1� = E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1� − E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1�, 
where y1fcp and y0fcp are the imports of firm f for cases when switching and not-switching, 
respectively.  
We cannot observe the last term, namely, the imports that would be obtained if a 
switching firm does not switch to another tariff regime. Thus, we replace the last term with 
the observable performance of non-switchers, namely, E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 0�. 
ATT = E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1� − E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 0�
+ �E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 0� − E�𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 |𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1��. 
We can obtain a consistent estimator of the ATT only if the bracketed term is equal to zero. 
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However, as theoretically demonstrated in the previous section, switching and non-
switching firms differ in terms of productivity and thereby imports. Thus, the bracketed 
term does not equal zero, and the estimates suffer from the sample selection bias. 
We follow the solution advocated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We first assume 
the following: 
𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓0 ⊥ 𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓|Prob�𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1| 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�. 
⊥ represents mathematical independence. Prob�𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1| 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�  is called a 
“propensity score” and indicates the probability of switching, conditional upon a vector of 
observable variables 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 . This assumption implies that if the probability of switching 
explained by a vector of observable variables 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the same between switching and non-
switching firms, imports obtained when not switching are also the same between those two 
firms. Another assumption is: 
Prob�𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1| 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� < 1. 
This assumption guarantees that firms with identical characteristics (i.e., 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ) can be 
observed among both switchers and non-switchers. With these two assumptions, the 
bracketed term in the above equation is equal to zero when the propensity score is common. 
After computing the propensity scores of switching, we employ the one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching method as the matching algorithm. The switching status is identified at 
the pair-level, that is, fcp. For simplicity, we denote this triple script by a single script i. I0, 
and I1 represent sets of non-switching and switching firms, respectively. We define the 
following: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≡ Prob(𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 1| 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖). 
Then, the pairs matched with firm i belong to the following set: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐼0|𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = argmin
𝑗𝑗
||𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗||� , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼1 . 
When the above first assumption holds between pairs 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼1 and 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , the following 
becomes a consistent estimator of switching: 
ATT𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 = � �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗0�
𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼1
. 
Finally, to control for the remaining selection bias resulting from unobservable 
temporary time-invariant factors, such as common macro effects, we combine the matching 
method with a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, along the lines of Heckman et al. 
(1998). We add time script t to the outcome variable, that is, y. Then, instead of the above 
first assumption, we assume that: 
(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−10 ) ⊥ 𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖|Prob�𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 1| 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�. 
Then, the above ATT estimator is replaced by: 
ATT𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀−𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 = � �(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−11 ) − �𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−10 ��
𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼1
. 
We compute this estimator. 
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     The propensity of switching is estimated using the logit model. Based on data 
availability, a vector of 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 includes the following elements:  
𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = �ln𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 ,𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓,𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗� 
𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 is firm f’s total exports evaluated at time t−1, while 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 represents 
the difference between MFN and RTA tariff rates (preference margin) when importing 
product p from country c at time t. 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗  includes country-sector fixed effects. The 
theoretical analysis in the previous section demonstrates that the less productive drawback 
users switch to the RTA regime. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information on firm 
characteristics, such as productivity or employment. Expecting that total exports are 
positively correlated with productivity, we use firms’ total exports instead of productivity.21 
The preference margin does not have a direct impact on the choice between the drawback 
and RTA regimes. It affects this choice indirectly by increasing the cutoff level of 
productivity, 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅. As Proposition 3 suggests, a higher 𝜑𝜑�𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷>𝑅𝑅 increases the likelihood of 
the switch from the DD to the RTA regime. 
     We also extend the vector 𝐗𝐗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 in the later estimation. For example, total exports are 
decomposed into average exports at a country-product-level and the number of country-
product pairs. We also use the following three variables that are defined at a firm level. The 
first is the share of exports to RTA member countries in the total exports at time t−1. While 
our import data can identify the tariff regime used, such information cannot be identified 
using the export data. Therefore, by using this share, we control the possibility of claiming 
the RTA regime and enjoying tariff reduction in exports. However, it must be noted that 
exports to RTA member countries do not necessarily follow the RTA regime because its 
utilization incurs some costs. The second is the share of imports from RTA members in the 
total imports at time t−1. This share is expected to control for the significance of the choice 
of switching in each firm. In addition, we introduce a dummy variable for foreign-owned 
firms because they may behave differently from indigenous firms. Finally, we also control 
for fixed effects of firms’ locations, which are identified at a province-level. 
 
4.2. Data  
     Our primary data are the export and import data obtained from the Customs of 
Thailand. These data cover all commodity exports and imports in Thailand at the 
transaction level. Specifically, these include customs clearing date, HS eight-digit code, 
                                                   
21 We cannot link our dataset with the industrial census owing to the absence of the common firm 
identification code. Nevertheless, we checked the correlation between labor productivity (i.e., total sales 
divided by the number of employees) and exports at an establishment-level, by employing the industrial 
census for 2007 (National Statistical Office, Thailand). Specifically, we regressed a log of exports on a log 
of labor productivity, province fixed effects, and ISIC four-digit fixed effects. As a result, the coefficient 
for labor productivity is estimated to be 1.13. The standard error clustered at an ISIC four-digit level is 
0.04. Thus, we believe that total exports are positively associated with productivity in Thailand. 
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exporting/importing country, firm identification code, values, and quantities. The import 
data also includes the information on the tariff regime. We aggregate the import data 
according to firms, countries, HS eight-digit codes, tariff regimes, and years. Thus, product 
p is defined at the HS eight-digit level. We categorize the tariff regime into four types, 
including —the MFN, RTA, duty drawback, and other regimes. Although we name it “duty 
drawback regime,” it includes the five regimes introduced in Section 2—bonded 
warehouses, free zones, investment promotion, duty drawback for raw materials imported 
for the production of exports, and duty drawback for re-exportation. There were no 
substantial changes in the rules of these regimes during the study period. We again use the 
abbreviation of DD for duty drawback in the empirical part. 
     We employ trade data from 2007 and 2011. Ideally, two years should be chosen based 
on the availability of RTAs (i.e., pre- and post-RTA periods). However, the data in 2007 is 
the oldest data. Indeed, Thailand already had RTAs with some countries (e.g., ASEAN 
countries) in 2007. Nevertheless, since few firms used RTA regimes in 2007, we believe that 
the choice of the year 2007 works well.22 The year 2011 was chosen to assure the longest 
interval under the consistent HS version, that is, HS 2007. While the outcome variable is the 
log difference between imports in 2007 and 2011, the independent variables in the logit 
model are evaluated in 2007, except for the preference margin assessed in 2011. The data on 
tariffs are obtained from the Customs of Thailand. We introduce country-sector fixed effects. 
The sector is defined at a two-digit level of ISIC Revision 3. To convert HS eight-digit codes 
to two-digit codes of ISIC, we use the correspondence table between HS six-digit codes and 
four-digit codes of the ISIC Revision 3 compiled by the World Integrated Trade Solution23. 
We also use business data compiled by the Department of Business Development in 
Thailand, which includes the basic information on firms. Using these data, we create a 
dummy variable for foreign-owned firms and identify firms’ locations (i.e., provinces). 
As of 2011, four bilateral RTAs and six plurilateral RTAs came into force in Thailand. 
The bilateral RTAs came into force in 2005, 2004, and 2007 in Australia and New Zealand, 
India, and Japan, respectively.24 Among the plurilateral RTAs, the ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement (ATIGA) was introduced in 2010 by revising the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
that became effective among the 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) in the 1990s. 
In addition, Thailand, together with the other ASEAN members, has concluded five 
plurilateral RTAs, called ASEAN+1 RTAs: ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA) in 2010, ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA) in 2005, ASEAN–India FTA 
(AIFTA) in 2010, ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) in 2009, and 
the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA) in 2010. Thus, we define the following 15 countries as RTA 
                                                   
22 In our robustness checks, we also drop country-product-pairs that were eligible to any RTAs in 2007. 
23 https://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html 
24 We do not include the RTA with Peru here because it entered into force in 31 December 2011. 
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partner countries: the nine ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and 
New Zealand.  
     There are five noteworthy points. First, we restrict the sampled firms to those with 
positive exports, in both 2007 and 2011, because non-exporters do not have the option to use 
the DD regime. Second, as found above, multiple RTAs overlap in many country-pairs. For 
example, when trading with ASEAN countries, firms in Thailand can choose an RTA regime 
among six RTAs (i.e., ATIGA and five ASEAN+1 RTAs). The preference margin is computed 
using the lowest available RTA tariff rates at a country-HS eight-digit level. Third, we define 
the tariff regime with the largest imports as the main tariff regime in each country-product-
year pair. We restrict the firm-country-product observations only to those wherein the main 
tariff regimes were the duty drawback regime in 2007 and either the duty drawback or RTA 
regime in 2011. Subsequently, our treatment variable, Switch, takes the value of one if the 
main regime is the RTA in 2011. Fourth, our analysis focuses on the imports of 
manufacturing products (15–37 in ISIC Revision 3) from these RTA partner countries. The 
study’s country-product pairs are restricted to those eligible for any RTAs, that is, those with 
a positive preference margin in 2011. Finally, when we merge the trade data with the 
business data, a considerable number of firms are dropped partly because we have business 
data only for manufacturing firms. Thus, we estimate both models with and without 
variables obtained from the business data. 
     Before reporting our estimation results, we provide an overview of the import “size” 
according to the main tariff regimes, which is shown in Table 1.25 It reports the share of each 
import value in the total imports, in 2011 at a firm-country-product-level. Here, we do not 
include observations not recorded in 2007 or 2011. The highest share is shown by the type 
where the main regime was the DD regime in both 2007 and 2011, indicating the significant 
role of the DD regime in imports in Thailand.26 The combination with the second-highest 
share is depicted by the use of the MFN regime in both 2007 and 2011. The type that 
switched from the DD regime to the RTA regime, which is our treatment group in the PSM 
analysis, accounts for 7%. Finally, as mentioned above, few firms used the RTA regime in 
2007. The type where the main regime was the RTA regime in 2007 accounted for less than 
1%. 
===   Table 1   === 
 
                                                   
25 In this table, the main regime includes the one under the regimes other than MFN, RTA, and DD 
regimes (i.e., Other). When we categorize the main tariff regime for the PSM analysis, we ignore the 
imports under this regime. 
26 It must be noted that there is a possibility of overestimating the magnitude of the DD imports. Even if 
firms import under the DD regime, they may cease to use the imported inputs for the production of 
export goods. In this case, they must pay import duties, while their imports remain as those under the 




5. Empirical Results 
     This section reports our estimation results. We report the results of our analyses using 
the PSM method. We also conduct some robustness checks. Subsequently, we report the 
results of the effects on exports and of the effects of switching from the MFN regime to the 
RTA regime.  
 
5.1. Basic Analyses 
Before the analysis by the PSM, we conducted two basic analyses. First, Figure 5 
depicts the distribution of the log-difference between the firm-country-product-level 
imports in 2007 and 2011. The distribution is shown for switchers and non-switchers 
separately. In both types, the major tariff regime was DD in 2007, but either DD or RTA in 
2011. Although both cases hit a peak at around a small positive number, the distribution for 
switchers appears to be more positively than that for non-switchers. According to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the hypothesis that non-switchers have a higher import 
growth than switchers, the largest difference between the distribution functions is 0.10. The 
approximate p-value for this is 0.000, which is significant. In summary, switchers seem to 
have a higher import growth than that of the non-switchers. 
===   Figure 5   === 
     Second, we regress the log-difference above on dummy variables, indicating the 
combination of the major tariff regimes between 2007 and 2011. In this regression, we 
include all importers, including those whose main regime was not the DD in 2007. The 
results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method are reported in Table 2. We may control 
for country fixed effects or/and HS eight-digit-level fixed effects. The base category is the 
one where the major regime was DD in both 2007 and 2011. The standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The results show that switchers from the DD to the RTA have 
positively significant coefficients, indicating that the switchers have a higher import growth 
rate than that of the non-switchers, which is consistent with the findings in Figure 5. Other 
noteworthy results are that, compared with the non-switchers, a relatively high growth rate 
is found in firms that changed from the RTA or MFN to the DD, while the firms that changed 
from the DD or RTA to the MFN have a relatively low growth rate. 
===   Table 2   === 
 
5.2. Baseline Results of the PSM 
     We begin the analyses using the PSM. Hereafter, we restrict the study observations to 
those in which the main regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. 
Subsequently, the treatment variable Switch takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 
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was the RTA. The upper panel in Table 3 reports the estimation results for the propensity 
scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Column (I) shows the result with 
the basic variables, including total exports, preference margin, and country-industry fixed 
effects. The coefficient for total exports is significantly negative, while the preference margin 
has an insignificant coefficient. Specifically, the DD importers with relatively small total 
exports switch to the RTA regime. This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction if 
total exports are positively associated with firms’ productivity. The insignificant result in 
the preference margin is perhaps because it plays only an indirect role in the choice between 
the DD and RTA regimes, as mentioned in Section 4.1. As shown in column (II), this result 
does not change even when adding the dummy variable to foreign companies and province 
fixed effects. The coefficient for a foreign dummy is insignificant. It must be noted that the 
number of observations remarkably decreased as a result of linking trade data with the 
business data.27 
===   Table 3   === 
     Based on the predicted propensity scores, we matched between the switchers and non-
switchers. Before discussing the results of the impacts of switching, we show the 
performance of our matching. The standardized difference and variance ratio of each 
covariate are reported in Table 4. The column numbers in this table correspond to those in 
Table 3. Compared to the case of the raw observations, the standardized difference among 
the matched observations should be smaller in absolute terms. Similarly, the variance ratio 
in the matched sample should be close to one. Columns (I) and (II) in Table 4 indicate that 
matching is successfully done in terms of standardized differences, but it is not necessarily 
successful in terms of variance ratios. The distribution of a log of total exports is presented 
in panel (a) in Figure B1 in Appendix B. Compared to the raw observations, the matched 
observations show a similar distribution between the switchers and non-switchers. 
===   Table 4   === 
     The lower panel of Table 3 reports the results for the outcome variable. We use 
standard errors based on the innovation of Abadie and Imbens (2016).28 Their method takes 
into account the fact that propensity scores are estimated, rather than known, when 
calculating standard errors. Both columns (I) and (II) show the positively significant impacts 
on imports, indicating that switching to the RTA increases imports by 34–40%. In our 
theoretical analysis in Section 3, we demonstrated that switching firms could either increase 
or decrease their imports. Our empirical analyses show that the effect of switching on 
imports is positive, on an average. To investigate the source of this increase, we examine the 
impacts on the import quantity and price by replacing the outcome variable in the PSM. The 
                                                   
27 To avoid such a decrease in the number of observations, Brandt and Morrow (2017) did not link trade 
data with the manufacturing survey. For completeness, we show the results in both kinds of study 
observations. 
28 To this end, we use the “teffects” command in Stata. 
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results are presented below for imports. Both the import quantity and price show positive 
effects, but only the effect on import quantity is significant. Thus, the increase in imports 
comes mainly from the increase in import quantity. 
     Next, we estimate other specifications in the logit model. In columns (III) and (IV), we 
decompose the total exports to the average exports and the number of country-product pairs. 
The logit results show that both variables have positive coefficients, but only the results in 
the average exports are significant. The DD importers with smaller average exports tend to 
switch to the RTA regime. In columns (V) and (VI), we introduce two variables of shares, 
that is, the shares of exports to and imports from RTA member countries to the specification 
used in columns (III) and (IV). These two variables do not have robust results. Only column 
(V) shows a significantly positive coefficient for the share of imports, while the significantly 
positive coefficient for the share of exports is found only in column (VI). The balancing tests 
based on these logit results are reported in the corresponding columns in Table 4. The 
distribution of a log of average exports is presented in panel (b), in Figure B1 in Appendix 
B. Similar to the case of total exports, compared to the raw observations, the matched 
observations show a similar distribution between the switchers and non-switchers. In all 
these estimations, the results of the impacts on imports remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Switching increases imports significantly, especially the import quantity. 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
     We conduct five kinds of robustness checks to confirm the validity of the 
aforementioned results. First, we only restrict the sampled products to manufacturing 
products. For more consistency with our theoretical setting, we further limit only to 
intermediate products, for example, parts. Finished products are defined as items 
categorized into 112, 122, 41, 51, 52, 61, 62, or 63 in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 
classification, while the rest are intermediate products. The results for the imports of parts 
are reported in Table B1, in Appendix B. The logit results are similar to those in Table 3. Both 
the total and average exports have significantly negative coefficients. However, the results 
for the outcome variables are not robust. Some specifications show insignificant impacts on 
import prices as well as imports and import quantities.  
     Second, we restrict import observations only to those that were not eligible for any 
RTAs in 2007. So far, we used the observations in 2007 for indicating those before the entry 
of RTAs into force. However, as mentioned in Section 4.2, Thailand already had RTAs in 
some countries, such as ASEAN countries. Although Table 1 indicates little use of RTA 
regimes when importing in 2007, we use the study observations that are more consistent 
with the theoretical setting, by restricting to the country-product pairs where no RTA tariffs 
were available in 2007. The estimation results are presented in Table B2 in Appendix B. 
Similar to the results for the imports of parts (i.e., Table B1), the logit results are similar to 
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those in Table 3, while the results of significantly positive coefficients in the outcome 
variables are not robust. 
     The third and fourth checks are also used to estimate subsamples. As the third check, 
we exclude import observations from Japan, which has been a top investing country in and 
has maintained a close economic relationship with Thailand. Thus, the trade between Japan 
and Thailand may follow different economic mechanisms, such as intra-firm trade. The 
fourth check excludes outliers in terms of the import growth. Specifically, we drop 
observations with the top 3% or the bottom 3% of import growth. The results of these two 
checks are shown in Tables B3 and B4 in Appendix B. The results for both the logit model 
and the impacts are similar to those in Table 3—switching increases imports and import 
quantity. 
     The last robustness check examines the effect of switching on imports at a firm level. 
So far, we estimated the model defined at a firm-country-product-level. Suppose that a firm 
switches the tariff regime for one product, but not for another product. In this case, the 
change in imports in the former product may also affect imports in the latter product if these 
products are interrelated. To incorporate such effects, we estimate the propensity of 
switching at a firm level and examine the effects on firm-level imports. The major tariff 
regime is also defined at the firm level. In this categorization of the major regime, we use 
the sum of imports of RTA-eligible products from RTA member countries. Subsequently, 
we focus on firms whose imports under the DD regime were larger than those under the 
RTA regime in 2007. Switch takes a value of one if imports under the RTA regime are higher 
than those achieved under the DD regime in 2011. The results are shown in Table 5. The 
logit estimation results indicate a weak result in total exports, while the average exports 
have significantly negative coefficients. The impacts on imports from RTA members are 
reported in the lower panel and again show positive effects. Specifically, the results indicate 
that switching increases imports from RTA member countries by around 30%. 
===   Table 5   === 
 
5.4. Impacts on Exports 
     In this subsection, we examine the impacts of switching on firms’ exports. Since these 
exports are defined at a firm level, matching is conducted by using the same model as that 
in Table 5. The impacts on firms’ total exports are shown in the lower panel of Table 5. The 
results indicate the insignificant effects of switching on total exports. We also examine the 
impacts on the exports to RTA member and non-member countries separately because the 
RTA formation not only led to a decline in input tariffs when importing but also led to a 
decline in output tariffs when exporting to the member countries. However, it must be noted 
that firms do not necessarily use RTA tariffs even when exporting to RTA member countries 
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because of the existence of their utilization costs.29 The results are reported in Table B5 in 
Appendix B but show insignificant results for both exports to RTA member and non-
member countries. 
     In Section 3, we theoretically demonstrate that there are two opposing effects on 
exports. The positive effect is based on the utilization of RTA tariffs in exporting, that is, the 
use of lower tariffs, while the negative effect comes from a surge in the input costs because 
of the compliance with RoO. The former effect works only when exporting to RTA partner 
countries and utilizing RTA tariffs. We also found a positive effect of switching on import 
prices for many specifications, but such an effect was insignificant. Our results on the 
impacts on exports, especially exports to RTA member countries, indicate that exports did 
not increase as greatly as offsetting the (insignificant) rise in input costs. Nevertheless, we 
found a significant increase in imports, especially import quantities. One possible reason for 
this increase in imports is that additional inputs are used to produce goods for the domestic 
market. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the share of domestic sales in the total sales is higher 
in switching firms.30 In sum, the switching firms increase their imports from RTA partner 
countries to produce goods for the domestic market, rather than to expand their exports. 
===   Figure 6   === 
 
5.5. Switching from the MFN Regime to the RTA Regime 
     Finally, we examine the impacts of switching from the MFN to RTA regime on imports 
in order to cover the entire perspective on firms that switch to the RTA regime. To this end, 
we restrict firm-country-product observations only to those wherein the main tariff regime 
was the MFN regime in 2007, and either the MFN or RTA regime in 2011. Our treatment 
variable, Switch, takes the value of one if the main regime was the RTA regime in 2011. We 
use the same variables for estimating the propensity of this type of switching, as in the case 
of switching from the DD regime. As shown in Table 1, in terms of imports, firms switching 
from the MFN to the RTA regime account for 16%, which is more than twice as large as 
those switching from the DD regime to the RTA regime. Thus, the impacts of the former 
type of switchers may have potentially larger impacts on national imports. 
     Table 6 presents the results. The logit estimation results indicate that the coefficients 
for the average exports are positive, which is opposite to the case of switching from the DD, 
though they are insignificant.31 Another noteworthy result is that the coefficients for the 
                                                   
29 It must be noted that the information on the tariff regime used in exporting is not available. 
30 This figure depicts the distribution of domestic sales shares in 2010. The domestic sales are computed 
by subtracting total exports from total sales. The data on total sales are obtained from the business data. 
It must be noted that we have those data only for 2010. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that the switching firm increases the domestic sales because firms in the DD regime do not sell 
their products in the domestic market. 
31  The results for imports of parts are shown in Table B6 in Appendix B. One result indicates the 
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preference margin are significantly positive, indicating that MFN users are more likely to 
switch to the RTA regime when the difference between MFN and RTA tariffs is larger. This 
result is natural because the difference between MFN and RTA tariffs directly affects the 
choice between the MFN and RTA regimes, unlike the choice between DD and RTA regimes. 
The results for the other variables are similar to those switching from the DD regime. The 
higher share of imports from RTA members is associated with a higher propensity to switch 
from the MFN to the RTA regime. Foreign-owned firms tend to keep using the MFN regime. 
===   Table 6   === 
Impacts on imports are reported in the lower panel and show positive effects. 
Specifically, the results indicate much larger coefficients than those in switching from the 
DD regime. Switching from the MFN regime to the RTA regime increases imports from RTA 
member countries by 71–107%. While the impacts on the import quantity are significantly 
positive with almost the same magnitude as those on imports, the import prices receive 
negative and insignificant effects (except for column (V)). Thus, as in the case of switching 
from the DD regime, most of the increase in imports comes from the increase in import 
quantities. The negative (but insignificant) impacts on import prices are not consistent with 
our expectation because of the measure of tariff-exclusive import prices. In the theoretical 
model, the fundamental price of the imported input is assumed to be constant. If each input 
is provided by a monopolistically competitive firm and the price–cost margin is not constant, 
then the RTA use can decrease import prices by decreasing the price–cost margin, as 
indicated by Hayakawa et al. (2019a). This also suggests that the adjustment costs to meet 
RoO are not significant.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
     This study theoretically and empirically examined how the entry of RTAs into force 
changes firms’ imports and exports in the presence of duty drawback regimes. We 
theoretically demonstrate that firms switching from the DD to the RTA regime could either 
increase or decrease their imports from RTA member countries, given that the use of RTA 
regimes does not provide additional benefit in terms of duty exemption and import prices 
may rise owing to the compliance with RoO. In the detailed firm-level trade data in Thailand, 
we found that firms’ switch from the DD to the RTA regime increases their imports from 
RTA member countries by around 30%. The switch from the MFN to the RTA regime 
increases imports by approximately 90%. However, it has also been revealed that mid-sized 
firms switching to the RTA regime in terms of total exports. The large-sized firms continue 
using the duty drawback regime in importing even after the entry of RTAs into force. 
Therefore, the impacts of RTAs on trade might not be substantial at a national level. Indeed, 
                                                   
significantly positive coefficient for the average exports. 
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in Thailand, the share of imports by these two kinds of switching firms is only 23%, even in 
the post-RTA period. 
     We also found that firms switch from the DD to the RTA regime to increase the 
imported inputs and use them to produce goods for the domestic market, rather than 
expand their exports. This result implies an increased presence of the domestic firms in the 
domestic market of the downstream or finished goods. This scenario toughens competition, 
and thereby dampens the imports of finished goods from RTA member countries. 
Specifically, RTAs may increase the trade in materials or inputs but not in finished goods. 
Indeed, when we estimate the gravity equation with RTA dummy variables for the 
worldwide trade, we find significantly positive trade creation effects for trade in materials 
but not for trade in finished goods (see Table B7 in Appendix B). In sum, under the presence 
of duty drawback regimes, the magnitude of trade creation effects by RTAs will differ 
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Table 1. The Share of Imports in Total Imports in 2011 according to the Major Tariff Regime 
in 2007 and 2011 (%) 
2007 DD MFN RTA Other
DD 28 3 7 1
MFN 4 23 16 6
RTA 0.1 0.05 0.63 0
Other 0.5 2 9 0.4
2011
 






Table 2. Simple OLS Estimation 
Base: 2007 = DD & 2011 = DD (I) (II) (III)
1 if 2007 = DD & 2011 = RTA 0.286*** 0.239*** 0.213**
[0.075] [0.078] [0.086]
1 if 2007 = DD & 2011 = MFN -1.029*** -1.074*** -1.051***
[0.081] [0.080] [0.083]
1 if 2007 = DD & 2011 = Other -0.276 -0.285 -0.134
[0.308] [0.293] [0.298]
1 if 2007 = RTA & 2011 = DD 1.816*** 1.812*** 2.098***
[0.458] [0.455] [0.500]
1 if 2007 = RTA & 2011 = RTA 0.596*** 0.641*** 0.713***
[0.169] [0.169] [0.192]
1 if 2007 = RTA & 2011 = MFN -0.713** -0.696** -0.720**
[0.321] [0.334] [0.344]
1 if 2007 = MFN & 2011 = DD 1.451*** 1.407*** 1.380***
[0.079] [0.081] [0.081]
1 if 2007 = MFN & 2011 = RTA 0.616*** 0.636*** 0.645***
[0.045] [0.045] [0.048]
1 if 2007 = MFN & 2011 = MFN 0.078** 0.069* 0.069*
[0.035] [0.037] [0.039]
1 if 2007 = MFN & 2011 = Other 0.323*** 0.409*** 0.383***
[0.081] [0.113] [0.112]
1 if 2007 = Other & 2011 = DD 0.511* 0.473 0.568
[0.278] [0.305] [0.396]
1 if 2007 = Other & 2011 = RTA 0.301*** 0.310*** 0.282***
[0.051] [0.061] [0.074]
1 if 2007 = Other & 2011 = MFN -0.261** -0.411*** -0.339***
[0.116] [0.096] [0.104]





R-squared 0.026 0.0696 0.1153
Number of obs. 98,159 97,472 93,097  
Notes: We estimate the model using the OLS method. The dependent variable is the log-difference 
between imports in 2007 and 2011 at a firm-country-product-level. The independent variables include 
various dummy variables indicating the combination of the major tariff regime between 2007 and 2011. 
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. The square brackets denote the standard 
errors clustered by firms. We may control for country fixed effects or/and HS eight-digit-level fixed effects.  
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Table 3. Effects of Switching on Imports of All Products 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.145*** -0.158***
[0.030] [0.052]
ln Average exports -0.189*** -0.181*** -0.195*** -0.183***
[0.044] [0.065] [0.044] [0.064]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.084 -0.125 -0.066 -0.07
[0.067] [0.092] [0.071] [0.102]
Share of exports to RTA members 0.01 0.745**
[0.238] [0.348]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.499* -0.019
[0.293] [0.383]
Margin -0.175 1.738 -0.182 1.74 -0.102 1.665
[0.720] [1.269] [0.719] [1.262] [0.697] [1.265]
Foreign dummy -0.279 -0.282 -0.384
[0.220] [0.222] [0.234]
Province FE X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.2021 0.2429 0.203 0.2432 0.2047 0.2484
Log pseudolikelihood -2876.6 -1609.4 -2873.6 -1608.9 -2867.4 -1597.8
Impacts
ln Imports 0.344*** 0.401*** 0.307*** 0.455*** 0.277*** 0.464***
[0.093] [0.129] [0.094] [0.138] [0.101] [0.144]
ln Quantity 0.222* 0.325** 0.213* 0.303* 0.265** 0.373**
[0.116] [0.148] [0.117] [0.167] [0.127] [0.169]
ln Price 0.122 0.076 0.094 0.153 0.012 0.091
[0.077] [0.093] [0.070] [0.105] [0.078] [0.094]
Number of obs. 13,834 7,484 13,834 7,484 13,834 7,484
Treated obs. 1,006 615 1,006 615 1,006 615
Control obs. (Raw) 12,828 6,869 12,828 6,869 12,828 6,869  
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM. The observations are restricted to those in which the main 
regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Then, the treatment variable Switch 
takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The upper panel reports the estimation 
results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the 
outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust 





Table 4. Balancing Test for Matched Firms in Table 3 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
ln Total exports
Raw S.D. -0.500 -0.472
Var R 1.020 1.469
Matched S.D. 0.024 0.101
Var R 0.811 0.681
ln Average exports
Raw S.D. -0.459 -0.411 -0.459 -0.411
Var R 1.022 1.440 1.022 1.440
Matched S.D. -0.009 -0.002 -0.023 -0.016
Var R 0.908 0.734 0.959 0.791
ln # of country-product pairs
Raw S.D. -0.372 -0.376 -0.372 -0.376
Var R 1.177 1.365 1.177 1.365
Matched S.D. 0.089 -0.059 0.045 0.018
Var R 1.091 0.920 0.975 0.881
Share of exports to RTA members
Raw S.D. -0.131 0.048
Var R 0.942 0.907
Matched S.D. -0.134 -0.133
Var R 0.924 0.988
Share of imports from RTA members
Raw S.D. -0.128 -0.176
Var R 0.926 1.049
Matched S.D. 0.035 -0.095
Var R 0.811 0.869
Margin
Raw S.D. 0.193 0.290 0.193 0.290 0.193 0.290
Var R 1.587 2.208 1.587 2.208 1.587 2.208
Matched S.D. -0.031 0.051 0.072 -0.006 0.063 0.043
Var R 0.557 1.142 1.420 0.954 1.447 1.236
Foreign dummy
Raw S.D. -0.425 -0.425 -0.425
Var R 2.006 2.006 2.006
Matched S.D. 0.011 0.025 0.025
Var R 0.989 0.976 0.976  
Notes: This table reports the balancing tests for the matching conducted in Table 3. We show the 
standardized differences (S.D.) and variance ratio (Var R) of each covariate. The column numbers 




Table 5. Effects of Switching on Imports and Exports: Firm-level Analyses 
(I) (II) (III) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.024 -0.051*
[0.018] [0.028]
ln Average exports -0.091*** -0.114***
[0.026] [0.039]
ln # of country-product pairs 0.090** 0.058
[0.037] [0.057]
Share of exports to RTA members -0.285** -0.072 -0.249* -0.034
[0.133] [0.206] [0.136] [0.211]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.394** 0.164 0.432*** 0.209
[0.160] [0.240] [0.162] [0.241]
Foreign dummy -0.18 -0.203
[0.156] [0.157]
Province FE X X
ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0717 0.1223 0.0755 0.1254
Log pseudolikelihood -1548.5 -744.1 -1542.0 -741.5
Impacts
ln Imports from RTA members 0.382*** 0.300** 0.305*** 0.294**
[0.095] [0.124] [0.093] [0.115]
ln Total exports 0.002 -0.011 -0.038 -0.033
[0.115] [0.129] [0.121] [0.145]
Number of obs. 2,758 1,354 2,758 1,354
Treated obs. 808 432 808 432
Control obs. (Raw) 1,950 922 1,950 922  
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM at the firm level. The observations are restricted to those in 
which imports under the DD regime are larger than those under the RTA regime in 2007. Then, the 
treatment variable Switch takes the value of one if firms had larger imports under the RTA regime than 
those under the DD regime in 2011. The upper panel reports the estimation results for the propensity 
scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the outcome variable are 
reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust errors. ***, **, and * 





Table 6. Effects of Switching from the MFN to RTA Regime 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.076*** -0.03
[0.012] [0.025]
ln Average exports 0.032 0.02 0.026 0.021
[0.021] [0.032] [0.020] [0.032]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.230*** -0.097* -0.213*** -0.084
[0.028] [0.054] [0.028] [0.053]
Share of exports to RTA members -0.065 0.076
[0.112] [0.181]
Share of imports from RTA members 1.053*** 0.748***
[0.136] [0.233]
Margin 2.327*** 2.076*** 2.595*** 2.231*** 2.532*** 2.251***
[0.393] [0.786] [0.393] [0.777] [0.378] [0.757]
Foreign dummy -0.678*** -0.661*** -0.666***
[0.146] [0.147] [0.150]
Province FE X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.2111 0.2244 0.2185 0.2256 0.2276 0.2298
Log pseudolikelihood -15116.3 -3749.7 -14974.9 -3743.9 -14800.2 -3723.9
Impacts
ln Imports 0.723*** 1.065*** 0.709*** 1.007*** 0.746*** 1.046***
[0.053] [0.098] [0.051] [0.097] [0.052] [0.098]
ln Quantity 0.773*** 1.153*** 0.724*** 1.179*** 0.741*** 1.105***
[0.062] [0.121] [0.059] [0.126] [0.060] [0.126]
ln Price -0.05 -0.089 -0.016 -0.172 0.006 -0.058
[0.039] [0.076] [0.038] [0.084] [0.039] [0.082]
Number of obs. 45,906 12,950 45,906 12,950 45,906 12,950
Treated obs. 6,746 1,596 6,746 1,596 6,746 1,596
Control obs. (Raw) 39,160 11,354 39,160 11,354 39,160 11,354  
Notes: This table reports the results of the PSM at a firm-country-product-level. The observations are 
restricted to those in which the main regime was the MFN in 2007 and either the MFN or the RTA in 2011. 
Then, the treatment variable Switch takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The 
upper panel reports the estimation results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. The results for the outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors 























Figure 5. The Distribution of Import Growth Rates 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Notes: The study observations are restricted to those in which the main regime was the DD in 2007 and 
either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Switch takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. 
 
 
Figure 6. The Distribution of Domestic Sales Shares 
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Appendix A. The Derivation of Trade Effects of RTA Formation 
Regarding the sign of Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), we have  





  (𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅)−𝑣𝑣(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘)1−𝑣𝑣 − 1�. 
A switch from the DD regime to the RTA regime increases the trade price of 𝑑𝑑 from ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 to 
𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘. This direct effect increases the import value of k. An increase in the price of the input 
from ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 to 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘 reduces the demand for k. Since the latter effect dominates the former, 
a higher 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 reduces Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖). Moreover, the import price of 𝑑𝑑∗ imported from a non-
partner country also increases from ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘∗ to 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘∗
𝑀𝑀 ?̃?𝑧𝑘𝑘∗ because firms no longer use the duty-
drawback system. The latter effect increases the demand for 𝑑𝑑 and it is reflected in the 
increase in the price index of inputs, 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷.32 Therefore, we have  





⋛   (𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅)𝑣𝑣(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘)𝑣𝑣−1. 
      Regarding Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), we have  
































Although the tariff reduction on the final good promotes exports, the increase in the input 
costs by the switch from the DD to the RTA discourages them. The former effect is captured 
                                                   
# Corresponding author: Kazunobu Hayakawa; Address: Wakaba 3-2-2, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba, 
261-8545, Japan. Tel: 81-43-299-9500; Fax: 81-43-299-9724; E-mail: kazunobu_hayakawa@ide-gsm.org. 
32 Furthermore, if other inputs imported from RTA-partner countries experience a larger increase in 
input prices, they increase 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷, and the price index of inputs is more likely to dominate the increase 
in the price of 𝑑𝑑.  
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by 1/𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎 , while the latter effect is captured by (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)ασ . If 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 = 1 , Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) < 0 always 
holds. Substituting Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) and Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) into Eq. (20), we have  





  (𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅)−𝑣𝑣(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘)1−𝑣𝑣 �1 +
𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵ℎ
𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥














1 + (𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)ασ − 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥−𝜎𝜎
(𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅/𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷)𝑣𝑣−(1−α)  (𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅)−𝑣𝑣(𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘)1−𝑣𝑣
− 1. 
Concerning firms that switched from the MFN to the RTA regime, Δ𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) for those 
imported from RTA countries is given by  



















� > 0. 
The first inequality is because of 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅 > 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 , under which the cost decrease of 𝑑𝑑 imported 
from a partner country, 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘, dominates the overall cost-decrease of inputs, 𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅. See Section 
3.4 for details. The second inequality is owing to 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 > 1 and 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 < 1. 
    If k is imported from the non-RTA countries, the changes in the value of inputs per unit 
of output become 










� < 0. 
Regarding Δ𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) and Δ𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖), we have 













− 1� > 0. 
Therefore, if k is imported from an RTA country, the switch from the MFN to the RTA regime 
will always increase the firms’ imports of that input. If k is imported from a non-RTA 
country, the shift will increase imports only when the positive output effects dominate the 





Appendix B. Other Tables 
 
Table B1. Effects of Switching on Imports of Parts 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM. The observations are restricted to those in which the main 
regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Then, the treatment variable Switch 
takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The upper panel reports the estimation 
results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the 
outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust 
errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In this table, we restrict the 
sample to intermediate products, which are categorized into neither 112, 122, 41, 51, 52, 61, 62, nor 63 in 
the BEC classification. 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.148*** -0.131***
[0.030] [0.049]
ln Average exports -0.186*** -0.130** -0.188*** -0.132**
[0.046] [0.065] [0.046] [0.065]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.096 -0.132 -0.083 -0.079
[0.065] [0.091] [0.068] [0.098]
Share of exports to RTA members 0.071 0.793**
[0.254] [0.372]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.282 -0.125
[0.308] [0.399]
Margin 0.127 2.18 0.136 2.181 0.149 1.975
[0.746] [1.545] [0.741] [1.547] [0.736] [1.549]
Foreign dummy -0.317 -0.316 -0.423*
[0.234] [0.235] [0.246]
Province FE X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.1886 0.2278 0.1892 0.2278 0.19 0.2336
Log pseudolikelihood -2280.8 -1273.6 -2278.9 -1273.6 -2276.8 -1264.1
Impacts
ln Imports 0.223** 0.315 0.394*** 0.271 0.357*** 0.265
[0.105] [0.218] [0.095] [0.218] [0.100] [0.188]
ln Quantity 0.141 0.22 0.340*** 0.125 0.325*** 0.191
[0.134] [0.211] [0.114] [0.218] [0.127] [0.198]
ln Price 0.082 0.095 0.054 0.147 0.032 0.074
[0.089] [0.100] [0.068] [0.097] [0.082] [0.102]
Number of obs. 9,320 5,145 9,320 5,145 9,320 5,145
Treated obs. 835 504 835 504 835 504
Control obs. (Raw) 8,485 4,641 8,485 4,641 8,485 4,641
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Table B2. Effects of Switching on Imports: Ineligible Pairs in 2007 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM. The observations are restricted to those in which the main 
regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Then, the treatment variable Switch 
takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The upper panel reports the estimation 
results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the 
outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust 
errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. This table reports the results 
when focusing on import observations that were not eligible for any RTAs in 2007. 
 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.149*** -0.130*
[0.037] [0.068]
ln Average exports -0.193*** -0.144* -0.203*** -0.151*
[0.051] [0.083] [0.052] [0.082]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.031
[0.074] [0.113] [0.079] [0.130]
Share of exports to RTA members 0.199 0.986**
[0.296] [0.465]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.684* -0.036
[0.349] [0.502]
Margin -2.858 -0.193 -2.857 -0.196 -2.621 -0.888
[1.951] [2.579] [1.939] [2.576] [1.918] [2.609]
Foreign dummy -0.501* -0.505* -0.656**
[0.275] [0.278] [0.302]
Province FE X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.1681 0.2124 0.169 0.2125 0.1736 0.2225
Log pseudolikelihood -1462.3 -764.7 -1460.7 -764.6 -1452.6 -754.8
Impacts
ln Imports 0.171 0.338* 0.214 0.569*** 0.230 0.388**
[0.135] [0.186] [0.152] [0.194] [0.143] [0.179]
ln Quantity 0.061 0.107 0.167 0.717*** 0.095 0.373
[0.164] [0.242] [0.182] [0.238] [0.182] [0.247]
ln Price 0.109 0.232* 0.047 -0.149 0.135 0.015
[0.108] [0.138] [0.098] [0.140] [0.105] [0.149]
Number of obs. 5,832 3,110 5,832 3,110 5,832 3,110
Treated obs. 522 293 522 293 522 293
Control obs. (Raw) 5,310 2,817 5,310 2,817 5,310 2,817
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Table B3. Effects of Switching on Imports: Excluding Japan 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM. The observations are restricted to those in which the main 
regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Then, the treatment variable Switch 
takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The upper panel reports the estimation 
results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the 
outcome variables are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust 
errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. This table reports the results 
when excluding import observations from Japan. 
 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.173*** -0.231***
[0.028] [0.046]
ln Average exports -0.214*** -0.253*** -0.224*** -0.253***
[0.048] [0.071] [0.049] [0.070]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.118* -0.202** -0.089 -0.156*
[0.065] [0.083] [0.067] [0.089]
Share of exports to RTA members -0.011 0.607*
[0.236] [0.332]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.747** -0.002
[0.301] [0.398]
Margin -0.222 1.975 -0.231 1.976 -0.105 1.916
[0.766] [1.344] [0.765] [1.339] [0.741] [1.339]
Foreign dummy -0.29 -0.293 -0.388
[0.242] [0.243] [0.252]
Province FE X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.1823 0.2466 0.1831 0.2467 0.1874 0.2508
Log pseudolikelihood -2160.1 -1137.0 -2158.0 -1136.7 -2146.6 -1130.6
Impacts
ln Imports 0.202* 0.582*** 0.183* 0.373*** 0.241** 0.528***
[0.115] [0.147] [0.108] [0.137] [0.103] [0.134]
ln Quantity 0.152 0.451** 0.102 0.128 0.212* 0.607***
[0.128] [0.181] [0.131] [0.169] [0.124] [0.151]
ln Price 0.05 0.132 0.08 0.245** 0.029 -0.079
[0.080] [0.112] [0.083] [0.095] [0.079] [0.097]
Number of obs. 7,782 4,090 7,782 4,090 7,782 4,090
Treated obs. 830 495 830 495 830 495
Control obs. (Raw) 6,952 3,595 6,952 3,595 6,952 3,595
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Table B4. Effects of Switching on Imports: Excluding Outliers 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM. The observations are restricted to those in which the main 
regime was the DD in 2007 and either the DD or the RTA in 2011. Then, the treatment variable Switch 
takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The upper panel reports the estimation 
results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the 
outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust 
errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. This table excludes the import 
observations from outliers in terms of import growth, that is, observations with the top 3% or bottom 3% 
of import growth. 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.146*** -0.159***
[0.030] [0.053]
ln Average exports -0.190*** -0.185*** -0.195*** -0.188***
[0.044] [0.066] [0.045] [0.065]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.085 -0.123 -0.066 -0.065
[0.066] [0.093] [0.071] [0.103]
Share of exports to RTA members -0.003 0.746**
[0.238] [0.350]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.527* 0.055
[0.294] [0.386]
Margin -0.074 1.846 -0.079 1.856 -0.002 1.786
[0.719] [1.290] [0.716] [1.281] [0.703] [1.289]
Foreign dummy -0.247 -0.251 -0.357
[0.220] [0.223] [0.234]
Province FE X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.1991 0.2367 0.1999 0.2369 0.2018 0.2426
Log pseudolikelihood -2737.3 -1523.8 -2734.4 -1523.2 -2727.9 -1512.0
Impacts
ln Imports 0.195** 0.403*** 0.246*** 0.410*** 0.304*** 0.437***
[0.077] [0.103] [0.080] [0.105] [0.080] [0.109]
ln Quantity 0.098 0.349*** 0.173* 0.335*** 0.215** 0.334**
[0.105] [0.123] [0.102] [0.131] [0.103] [0.143]
ln Price 0.097 0.054 0.073 0.075 0.089 0.103
[0.073] [0.092] [0.068] [0.096] [0.075] [0.104]
Number of obs. 12,678 6,850 12,678 6,850 12,678 6,850
Treated obs. 967 584 967 584 967 584
Control obs. (Raw) 11,711 6,266 11,711 6,266 11,711 6,266
50 
 
Table B5. Effects of Switching on Imports and Exports: Firm-level Analyses 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of PSM at the firm level. The observations are restricted to those in 
which imports under the DD regime are larger than those under the RTA regime in 2007. Then, the 
treatment variable Switch takes the value of one if firms had larger imports under the RTA regime than 
those under the DD regime in 2011. The upper panel reports the estimation results for the propensity 
scores. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results for the outcome variable are 
reported in the lower panel. The standard errors are the Abadie-Imbens robust errors. ***, **, and * 
indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
  
(I) (II) (III) (VI)
Logit results
ln Average exports -0.089*** -0.084** -0.128*** -0.155***
[0.027] [0.042] [0.032] [0.047]
ln # of country-product pairs 0.151*** 0.130** 0.042 0.01
[0.040] [0.063] [0.046] [0.068]
Share of exports to RTA members -0.023 0.16 0.174 0.337
[0.152] [0.237] [0.154] [0.240]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.242 0.124 0.620*** 0.326
[0.170] [0.255] [0.171] [0.257]
Foreign dummy -0.111 -0.118
[0.166] [0.171]
Province FE X X
ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0852 0.1302 0.0901 0.138
Log pseudolikelihood -1411.3 -674.9 -1209.4 -608.2
Impacts
ln Exports to RTA members 0.086 0.099
[0.098] [0.124]
ln Exports to Non-members 0.127 0.113
[0.127] [0.191]
Number of obs. 2,606 1,250 2,180 1,124
Treated obs. 727 390 651 361
Control obs. (Raw) 1,879 860 1,529 763
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Table B6. Effects of Switching from the MFN to the RTA Regime on Imports of Parts 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the PSM at a firm-country-product-level. The observations are 
restricted to those in which the main regime was the MFN in 2007 and either the MFN or the RTA in 2011. 
Then, the treatment variable Switch takes the value of one if the main regime in 2011 was the RTA. The 
upper panel reports the estimation results for the propensity scores. The standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. The results for the outcome variable are reported in the lower panel. The standard errors 
are the Abadie-Imbens robust errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In 
this table, we restrict the sample only to intermediate products, which are categorized as neither 112, 122, 
41, 51, 52, 61, 62, and 63 in the BEC classification. 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Logit results
ln Total exports -0.069*** -0.017
[0.012] [0.026]
ln Average exports 0.036* 0.044 0.031 0.045
[0.019] [0.034] [0.019] [0.034]
ln # of country-product pairs -0.218*** -0.098* -0.200*** -0.091*
[0.030] [0.054] [0.030] [0.054]
Share of exports to RTA members 0.018 0.02
[0.106] [0.192]
Share of imports from RTA members 0.800*** 0.525**
[0.130] [0.243]
Margin 3.066*** 4.205*** 3.312*** 4.369*** 3.199*** 4.283***
[0.576] [0.997] [0.580] [1.012] [0.581] [1.015]
Foreign dummy -0.653*** -0.624*** -0.629***
[0.141] [0.143] [0.146]
Province FE X X X X
Country-ISIC 2-digit FE X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.2125 0.2286 0.2197 0.2304 0.2252 0.2324
Log pseudolikelihood -8723.6 -2446.0 -8644.4 -2440.2 -8583.7 -2434.0
Impacts
ln Imports 0.708*** 1.073*** 0.718*** 1.088*** 0.654*** 1.038***
[0.071] [0.128] [0.068] [0.117] [0.063] [0.144]
ln Quantity 0.786*** 1.130*** 0.851*** 1.261*** 0.757*** 1.090***
[0.082] [0.144] [0.079] [0.149] [0.075] [0.177]
ln Price -0.078 -0.057 -0.132*** -0.174 -0.103** -0.052
[0.048] [0.089] [0.051] [0.122] [0.051] [0.113]
Number of obs. 26,791 8,150 26,791 8,150 26,791 8,150
Treated obs. 3,878 1,071 3,878 1,071 3,878 1,071
Control obs. (Raw) 22,913 7,079 22,913 7,079 22,913 7,079
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Table B7. Gravity Results using the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of the gravity equations for trade among 222 countries 
during 1995–2017. The standard errors are clustered by country pairs. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance, respectively. We employ the BACI database available in the CEPII. The RTA dummy 
variable is drawn from Egger and Larch (2008) and its 2020 update by using RTA information available 
on the World Trade Organization website (Egger, Peter, & Larch, Mario, 2008, Interdependent 
Preferential Trade Agreement Memberships: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of International Economics, 
76(2): 384-399). CU, FTA, and PSA take a value of 1 for trade among the members of the customs union, 
free trade agreement, and partial scope agreement, respectively. RTA takes a value of 1 if any of these 
dummy variables takes a value of 1. Finished products (Finish) are defined as items categorized into 112, 
122, 41, 51, 52, 61, 62, or 63 in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, while the rest are 
intermediate products (Material). We also control for exporter-year fixed effects, importer-year fixed 




(I) (II) (III) (IV)









Number of observations 551,547 556,189 551,547 556,189
Log pseudolikelihood -4.E+09 -2.E+09 -4.E+09 -2.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9903 0.9928 0.9903 0.9928
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Figure B1. Balance Plots 




(b) Average exports: Column (III) in Table 3.  
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